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ABSTRACT 
 
As of September 2014, 35 countries have benefited under the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) Initiative as the program is near completion, of which 29 are in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) with a total spending of around US$75 billion. This paper measure the 
impact of debt relief under the HIPC Initiative on investment (total, private and public) in 
SSA within the framework of the debt overhang hypothesis and the fiscal space theory. The 
Difference in Difference model was applied on a panel data of 15 countries, only 8 countries 
that received debt relief from 2003 to 2005 and 7 non-HIPC covering the period 1996 to 2013 
to access the impact of HIPC Initiative in SSA on total, private and public investment. 
The results indicated that HIPC Initiative had significant impact on total investment in 
the region. This increase in total investment in SSA was mainly driven by private investment, 
which proved to have highly responded positively to debt relief owing to improved 
macroeconomic stability brought by the implementation of set conditionalities. However, 
there was little evidence to support the claim the HIPC Initiative has significant impact of 
public investment. In this regard, the results supported the debt overhang hypothesis in SSA 
and found little evidence for the fiscal space theory. This paper, therefore, concluded that 
debt relief  affects investment in SSA by; 1) eliminating the debt overhang and encouraging 
investment and then growth, and 2) improving institutional and governance quality of 
beneficiary countries that will adopt specific reform programs and in turn encourage private 
investment.  
Key Words: Debt relief, HIPC Initiative, Debt Overhang, Fiscal Space, Investment (Total, 
private and public) 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative was launched in 1996 and was 
further enhanced in 1999 by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) (Gunduz. et. al. 
2013, p8), with the objective of creating a harmonized environment for creditors to provide 
debt relief to poor countries in order to reduce poverty and encourage sustainable growth. 
Benefiting from debt relief is not automatic. In order to receive debt relief under the HIPC 
Initiative, indebted countries have to meet a set of specific criteria including implementing 
poverty reduction policies and demonstrate a good track record of macroeconomic and 
institutional reforms with the approval of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). Figure 1 reviews the HIPC implementation process. 
Figure 2: The HIPC Implementation Process 
                     Decision point requirements       Floating completion point requirements 
 
 
  
  
 
 
   
 Source: The World Bank, retrieved on 22/09/2015  
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improving doing business index), which mainly aim at improving policies and governance in 
recipient countries.  
It is worth noting that the above conditionalities imposed by the IFIs under the HIPC 
initiative were critical towards achieving good governance, macroeconomic stability and debt 
sustainability, thus sending a signal to the investors that HIPCs in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
were committed to sustainable growth. Domeland and Kharas (2009) noted that, “an 
improved debt sustainability outlook—accompanied by an enhanced security situation, better 
macroeconomic performance, and high commodity prices - has led to increased interest in 
Sub-Saharan Africa by foreign investors” p137.  
1.1. Statement of the Problem 
The International Monetary Fund’s 2014 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
Initiative and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) statistical update indicated that, as of 
September 2014, 35 countries have benefited under the HIPC Initiative as the program is near 
completion, of which 29 are in SSA. In addition, 4 countries in SSA are at the interim and 
pre-decision points. This was attained with a total spending of around US$75.0 billion under 
the HIPC Initiative as at end-2013. 
The principal objective of the HIPC Initiative at its launch in 1996 and later enhanced in 
1999, was to reduce the debt burden of indebted poor countries to sustainable levels, with 
harmonized efforts from all creditors including multilateral institutions and individual 
bilateral creditors (IMF and World Bank, 2001). IMF and World Bank (2001) further defined 
sustainable debt as, the “levels that allow these countries to service their debt through export 
earnings, aid, and private capital inflows without compromising long-term, poverty-reducing 
growth” (IMF website, 2001). The aims indicated here could be achieved since indebted 
countries are required to implement a range of good policies and reforms including 
macroeconomic and governance under the surveillance of the multilateral financial 
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institutions, (the World Bank and IMF), under the auspices of the IMF Staff Monitored 
Programme and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). However, this author is of the 
view that the lasting solution to sustainable growth and poverty reduction is increased 
investment.  
A recent study by Marceline and Hakobyan (2014) which aimed at investigating 
whether the HIPC Initiative managed to spur growth concluded that debt relief can stimulate 
growth but could not establish a clear channel through which such growth is achieved. The 
study however pointed out the need for further research on the impact of debt relief on 
investment. Hence, there is need to address this gap by testing whether debt relief under 
HIPC was able to stimulate investment, with particular attention to SSA. Furthermore, the 
objective of two investment agencies in an economy are different, that is, the government and 
private sector. It is also important to distinguish the impact of debt relief on total, private and 
public investment separately (Ndiaye, 2014) based on the arguments from the Debt Overhang 
Hypothesis and the Fiscal Space Theory, taking into account the crowding out effect.  
1.2. Significance of the Study 
The main objective of this paper is to measure the impact of debt relief under the HIPC 
Initiative in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) within the framework of the debt overhang hypothesis 
and the fiscal space theory. Understanding the causal effects of HIPC which was designed to 
help poor countries attain the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) will help develop 
harmonized donor efforts towards achieving the post-MDGs development programs, as well 
as designing ideal guidelines for debtors in line with sustainable growth targets in SSA. There 
is no research which has been done with particular emphasis on SSA in terms of the impact 
of debt relief on investment. In addition, no studies have yet investigated the difference in the 
impact of HIPC on public and private investment in Sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, this 
study will address this gap. 
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1.3. Research Questions 
The following are research questions that have to be answered at the end of this research: 
i. What is the impact of debt relief (HIPC) on total investment in SSA? 
ii. What is the impact of debt relief (HIPC) on: 
a. Private investment and  
b. Public investment in SSA? 
iii. Is there any difference between the impact of debt relief on private sector investment 
and the impact on public sector on investment? 
 
The mechanism through which the HIPC Initiative is implemented by the donor 
community is directly derived from the Debt Overhang Hypothesis [Myers (1977), Cohen 
and Sachs (1986), Sachs (1989) and Krugman (1988), Koeda (2008), Sichula (2012), 
Marceline and Hakobyan (2014)]. The theory put forward that indebted countries experience 
low levels of investment and economic growth since high debt stock is a disincentive to 
investment and structural adjustment, thus new investments will benefit creditors only. It, 
therefore, advocates for debt reduction which could help stimulate private investment in SSA 
since there could be reduced uncertainty, improved structural and macroeconomic policies 
and reforms.  
In addition, the Fiscal Space Theory can also be used to explain how debt relief can 
stimulate public investment in SSA. Heller (2005) defined fiscal space as the ability of an 
autonomous nation to fund current and capital expenditures, including debt service without 
compromising its future programs and priorities. The space can be generated from pursuing 
rigorous, reliable and well-organized macroeconomic policies, as well as the reduction in 
unproductive current expenditures. Under the HIPC initiative, fiscal consolidation is critical 
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to reach the completion point, thus government will have resources to channel towards capital 
expenditures.  
In support of the above theories, Domeland and Kharas (2009) and Addison (2006) 
summarised channels debt relief under the HIPC Initiative could stimulate growth and 
encourage investment. This is by: 1) altering the debt dynamics and freeing domestic 
resources from debt servicing for development expenditures (creating fiscal space), 2) 
encouraging investment and then growth by removing the debt overhang, 3) clearing way for 
new financing in both private and public investment, and 4) improving institutional and 
governance quality of beneficiary countries that will adopt specific reform programs and in 
turn encourage private investment. 
1.4. Hypothesis and Assumptions 
The IMF (2014) pointed out that HIPC Initiative has significantly reduced recipient 
countries’ indebtedness, thus the creation of fiscal space, while enabling them to focus on 
poverty-reducing expenditures. The report showed that HIPCs are spending about five times 
the amount of debt-service on health and education combined. In addition, the World 
Economic and Financial Surveys (2014) report pointed out that growth in SSA has improved 
due to an increase in infrastructure investment, agriculture production, and services, mainly 
financed by capital from foreign direct investment, a result of lower debt levels in many SSA 
countries, which could prove the debt overhang hypothesis.  
Given the above, it could be reasonable to claim that investment in SSA have improved 
due to the HIPC Initiative in the countries that received debt relief. Therefore, the following 
two hypothesis and assumptions will be tested in this paper to answer the research questions.  
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Hypothesis 1: Debt relief (HIPC) can stimulate investment in SSA, both private and public 
Based on the reasons mentioned under the debt overhang hypothesis and the fiscal 
space theory, this paper seeks to investigate whether the debt relief under HIPC Initiative was 
enough to stimulate investment. Total investment is the sum of private investment and public 
investment. Investment is argued to have improved owing to the improved macroeconomic 
and structural policies that are implemented in consultation with the World Bank and IMF. 
The key assumption here is that all countries that successfully attain the HIPC completion 
point would have implemented in full the IMF Staff Monitored Programme and the PRSP, 
meeting all the set targets and continue to implement such policies for sustained growth.  
Hypothesis 2: There is different impact of debt relief (HIPC) on private and public investment. 
The separation of private investment and public investment is necessitated by 
differences in investment behavior of government and the private sector. In SSA, as 
mentioned by the World Economic and Financial Surveys 2014, FDI drives private 
investment in SSA. In light of this, it is reasonable to assume that the private investors 
respond to debt relief within the debt overhang hypothesis argument when making their 
choices for investment. Sustained macroeconomic and institutional policies coupled with 
lower debt levels will stimulate confidence in the private investors given anticipated lower 
future taxes as well as the commitment by the government to continue implementing policies 
that are business friendly after the completion point.  
Public investment is argued to respond differently to private investment under the fiscal 
space theory. While during the HIPC Initiative implementation phase the government is 
required to focus on social spending on health and education, fiscal space will be created after 
the implementation period, where governments have more room to prioritise capital 
expenditure. In addition, additional fiscal space gives governments room to negotiate much 
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cheaper new financing for infrastructure projects, which will also help stimulate public 
investment.  
In this regard, I assume that private investment is stimulated in line with the debt 
overhang hypothesis while public investment is driven by created fiscal space. In addition, 
because of the differences in these economic two investment agencies (private and public 
sector), differences in response to debt relief between the two groups of investors is expected, 
with private investment which is assumed to be more responsive to changes is 
macroeconomic environment (because of quick decision making process) expected to be 
more responsive to debt relief than public investment. That is, debt relief is expected to have 
higher impact on private investment than public investment.  
1.5. Organization of the Study 
The paper will proceed as follows: Section 2 will provide a review of the theoretical and 
empirical literature on debt relief, placing a particular emphasis on the debt overhang and the 
fiscal space theory. Section 3 will look at the model description as well as data used and 
methodology. Section 4 examines the impact of debt relief on investments, that is estimation 
and results, including interpretation of the results. The conclusion and recommendations will 
be in section 5. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Given the conditionality under the HIPC Initiative, particularly the implementation of 
the PRSP, this literature review seeks to broaden and understand the theoretical framework, 
under which the HIPC Initiative is implemented, identify and critically analyze studies and 
models used before to evaluate the impact of debt relief in recipient countries with particular 
reference to investment. The review will first look at the identified two theories that explain 
how reducing a country’s external debt burden can stimulate investment which are; the Debt 
Overhang Hypothesis (Myers, 1977) and the Fiscal Space Theory (Heller, 2005). Based on 
the theoretical framework, the review will analyze the mixed empirical evidence on the 
impact of HIPC Initiative on investment, although many researchers have focused on the 
impact of debt relief on economic growth, poverty and fiscal variables. This review will put 
emphasis on the impact of debt relief on investment channels, particularly under the HIPC 
Initiative.  
2.1. Theoretical Review 
2.1.1. The Debt Overhang Hypothesis 
The debt overhang hypothesis was developed by Myers (1977) under the theory of the 
firm. He stated that, “value of the firm…depends on its future investment strategy”, p163. 
The theory argued that if a firm has huge debt, its new investments’ returns are totally used to 
pay existing debt, which will not improve the firm’s assets, leading to fewer prospects for 
investment and growth. Meyers stated that “if the incremental investment…is debt 
financed,… increase in the firm’s debt ratio erodes the old bondholders’ position…[and] the 
capital gains to stockholders and old bondholders is reduced and possible eliminated”, p165. 
In addition, Krugman (1988), applying the concept at country level, examined the tradeoffs 
facing creditors between forgiving debts and refinancing for countries in debt overhang. As in 
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Meyers’ theory of the firm, he concluded that a country’s new investments will only benefit 
the new creditors, thus indebted countries are not motivated to new borrowing and investment.  
Partial debt relief such as the HIPC Initiative benefits both creditor and debtor 
countries. Cohen and Sachs (1986) analyzed the growth patterns of countries with external 
debt overhang in the possibility of debt forgiveness. The authors concluded that debtors will 
develop a disincentive to adjust their economic progress in anticipation of full debt relief, if 
debt becomes unsustainable. Sachs (1989) supported the argument by stating that if new 
financing is given to countries in debt crisis, “compliance of debtor countries with 
conditionality is rather weak…since a large stock of debt can itself be an important 
disincentive to good behavior” p257, given the prior point that creditors are expected to 
benefit from new financing and conditionality. The author concluded that only partial debt 
relief can motivate debtors to invest and boost growth at the same time guaranteeing creditors 
of their future loan repayments. This win-win situation is currently applied by The World 
Bank and IMF in implementing the HIPC Initiative in low income countries.  
Koeda (2008) on the debt overhang model indicated that, “one-time stock treatment 
[debt relief] may help the low income country get out of the poverty trap, provided that the 
freed-up resources are used effectively,” p14. Thus savings from debt relief can only be 
efficient if used on productive investments, with strict compliance on conditional 
macroeconomic targets, while at the same time promoting private investment. Based on this 
view, it is critical that this paper seeks to evaluate whether the HIPC Initiative recipient 
countries benefited from the elimination of the debt overhang through the effective use of 
resources generated from debt relief based on the implementation of conditionalities set by 
the IFIs, and attract new financing, particularly private investment.  
The application of the theory mainly to the private investment is based on the 
following: 1) reduced debt reduced uncertainty to the private investment on the 
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government’s future increase in taxes, 2) the process leading to debt relief helps create 
conducive environment for investment with good governance, macroeconomic stability 
and structural reforms which private investors prefer, and 3) improves the countries credit 
worthiness which enables private investors to have access to the international capital 
markets.  
This argument on the debt overhang hypothesis is inspired by Pattillo et al., (2004) 
who indicated that, “negative impact of high debt on growth operates both through a 
strong negative effect on physical capital accumulation and on total factor productivity 
growth” p4. 
2.1.2. The Fiscal Space Theory  
Fiscal Space can be defined as the ability of a sovereign government to fund both 
current and capital expenditures, including debt service without compromising its future 
programs and priorities, as well as its flexibility in adjusting expenditures. According to 
Heller (2005), fiscal space can be created through the pursuit of sound, consistent and 
efficient macroeconomic policies, as well as the reduction in unproductive current 
expenditures.  
When creditors provide debt relief under the HIPC Initiative, one of the critical 
conditions towards achieving the completion point is the implementation of sound 
macroeconomic policies under the auspices of the IMF-SMP and PRSP, which will place 
particular emphasis on fiscal consolidation. Heller’s view stipulates that, fiscal space can be 
also produced by policies that increase the potential growth of a country. In this context, all 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) considered in this paper have successfully completed 
these two programs, thus it is reasonable to believe that beneficiaries of the HIPC Initiative 
have managed to strengthen their fiscal position and allocated resources to more productive 
needs, thus public investment. In addition to the above, on investment, Heller’s theory 
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suggests that, “IMF-supported programs set limits on net domestic borrowing, thus allowing 
for accommodation of foreign-financed infrastructural investments and social expenditures in 
priority sectors,” p12. Therefore, cooperation with development partners and coordination 
with the IMF for donor support would help to stimulate investment and generate additional 
productive capacity for the economy.  
This paper used this theory to argue that debt relief will help create fiscal space in the 
following ways: 1) successful implementation of sound policies under the IFIs conditionality, 
including recurrent expenditure reduction, 2) reduction in government debt servicing 
expenditures, 3) ability of a government to attract new financing which depends on the level 
of debt and in this case it will be low.  
2.2. Empirical Review 
There is a conflicting view on the impact of debt relief in recipient countries and 
different studies have been conducted to establish, confirm or refute the above theories. 
However, most studies could not focus strictly on the impact of HIPC on investment, 
including separating public investment from private investment. Findings in the literature are 
ambiguous, with others supporting the debt overhang hypothesis and fiscal space theory, 
while others opposing the theories. Starting from the most recent literature focusing on 
economic growth and investment, the empirical evidence on the supporters and opposes of 
the debt overhang will be discussed first, followed by fiscal space theory. An overview on the 
implications of this review on this paper will conclude this section.  
2.2.1. The Debt Overhang Hypothesis 
Marcelino and Hakobyan (2014) investigated whether HIPC Initiative stimulates 
growth, directly or indirectly through investment using the growth and investment models. 
Their results indicated that HIPC countries achieved higher growth, but could not establish 
whether this was through higher investment or another channel. They applied the System-
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Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) on a sample of 72 countries for the period 1996 to 
2011 to addresses potential endogeneity and country fixed effects. They used HIPC dummy 
to differentiate countries that received debt relief and others. Although HIPC was 
insignificant on investment, the authors concluded that, “the significant and positive effect on 
growth from the higher investment can be associated with debt relief,” p18. In conclusion, 
they recommended further research on the impact of debt relief on investment, of which this 
paper aims to fill the gap.  
The single most comprehensive empirical work that directly looked into the impact of 
debt relief on investment was by Knoll (2013). The study tested the validity of the debt 
overhang hypothesis from a sample of 82 developing countries which were eligible to borrow 
from World Bank’s IDA window for the period 1991 to 2011. The author used the average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATET) on repeated cross sections. Results from the study 
show significant impact of HIPC Initiative on total investment mainly driven by private 
investment. In this regard, based on this research, debt relief resulted in higher private 
investment in beneficiary countries and could not stimulate public investment.  
The debt overhang hypothesis has been empirically tested in Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), part of SSA by Sichula (2012) in which 5 countries have 
received debt relief under the HIPC Initiative between 2001 to 2006, using data from 1970 to 
2011. The results suggest that external debt growth negatively affecting growth before HIPC 
completion and the reduction in external debt improved growth. However, the researcher was 
not conclusive on the debt overhang effects on investment but suggested that debt service has 
no effects on investment.  
Raddatz (2009) targeted the impact of debt relief under the multilateral debt relief 
initiative (complementing HIPC) on private investment through the stock market, based on 
the critical assumption of efficient markets that stock prices reflect the impact of debt relief 
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(at all HIPC process critical stages) by increasing firm’s value owing to country’s 
improvements prospects and reduction in future taxes. The research used data from 35 South 
African companies with 187 subsidiaries in HIPCs countries in Africa over a period from 
1995 to 2006. Results from this study show abnormal returns on these companies as stock 
prices of these companies increased significantly than other firms in South Africa after 
announcement of HIPC processes. In summary, this paper found a positive impact of debt 
relief on private investment.  
On the other hand, Chauvin and Kraay (2005) assessed whether $100 billion aid 
delivered in form of debt relief to low income countries by 2003 has successfully reduced the 
debt overhang and free up debt service resources to development spending. Chauvin and 
Kraay’s study found that debt relief affected the level and composition of public spending 
(fiscal adjustment) although it could not stimulate growth, investment and quality of policies 
and institutions. They indicated that debt relief was used to reduce taxes by government and 
only managed to increase the share of health and education as a share of total spending. In 
addition, Bert and Helmut (1990) after testing the impact of debt relief on investment found 
that there is no negative correlation between debt and investment, and concluded against the 
debt overhang hypotheses. They concluded that additional financing for investment is a 
solution for a debt burdened country than debt relief. It could be important to note that the 
findings of these papers could not reflect the current benefits of Sub Saharan Africa given 
that only few countries had achieved the HIPC completion by 2005. 
Other studies in support of the debt overhang theory include Bhattacharya and 
Clements (2004). Their results suggested that high debt levels above 50% of debt threshold 
negatively affect economic growth in low-income countries, thus debt relief can reverse the 
effects. They, however, found that debt does not discourage private investment but affect 
growth through its effect on resources use efficiency.  
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2.2.2. The Fiscal Space Theory  
Empirical study on the impact of debt relief through fiscal space theory on a sample 
of 24 SSA countries for the period 1996 to 2011 by Cassimon at el (2013) pointed out that 
HIPC was significant to low income countries. They found positive debt relief impact on 
public investment. In addition, a study by Cassimon and Campenhout (2007) indicated that 
fiscal impact of debt relief follow complex dynamics, where it initially reduces public 
investment in the short run, with medium term positive effects. This implies that debt relief 
encourages public investment spending in the economy, in support of the fiscal space theory.  
Quattri and Fosu (2012), investigated the impact of the external debt-servicing and 
external aid, on government expenditure allocation (fiscal space) in sub-Saharan Africa 
countries after the launch of HIPC using a panel data of 40 SSA countries (29 HIPCs), for the 
period 1995-2009. Their results suggested that external debt payments negatively affect 
government expenditure. However, regarding the HIPC effect, the negative effect is smaller 
after the launch of HIPC than the pre-HIPC period. They concluded that HIPC have achieved 
its targets, including effective public expenditure allocation. Although not clearly conclusive, 
the paper suggests that HIPC has no impact on public investment, but on social expenditures. 
Clements, Bhattacharya and Nguyen (2003) examine the channels through which 
external debt affects growth using the fixed effects and system General Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimation for 55 low-income countries from 1970 to 1999. Their argument was 
based on Koeda (2006)’s view that the impact of debt in emerging markets is different from 
low income countries. Their results suggested that, “reductions in external debt service could 
also provide an indirect boost to growth through their effects on public investment”, p1. 
2.3. Implications of the review 
Attaining HIPC completion point in this paper is assumed to be evidence for 
commitment to continue implementing sound macroeconomic policies thus encouraging 
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investment and new financing. Birdsall, Claessens and Diwan (2002) investigated if HIPC 
debt could revitalize official flows to Africa with special emphasis on the donor community. 
They argued that HIPC influence the behavior of donor’s in terms of; 1) additionality (where 
debt relief will be followed by additional resources flow), 2) efficiency and ownership 
(successful implementation PRSP through efficient use resources saved from debt relief, with 
proper institutions and governance), and 3) selectivity (donors prefer channeling resources to 
countries with sustained good governance and institutions).  
Table 9: Summary of Studies: Impact of debt relief on Investment 
Author Sample Investment 
Total Private Public  
Marcelino and 
Hakobyan (2014) 
72 countries 
(1996 – 2011) 
No impact   
Knoll (2013) 82 countries 
(1991 –2011) 
Positive 
impact 
Positive 
impact 
No impact 
Cassimon at el 
(2013) 
24 SSA countries  
(1996 – 2011) 
  Positive impact 
Cassimon and 
Campenhout (2007) 
28 HIPC countries  
(1991 – 2004) 
  Negative impact (short run) 
Positive impact (Medium 
term) 
Chauvin and Kraay 
(2005) 
(1989 – 2003) No impact   
Sichula (2012) 5 HIPCs in SADC  
(1970- 2011) 
No impact No impact No impact 
Raddatz (2009).  
 
35 South African companies 
with 187 subsidiaries in 
HIPCs countries in Africa  
(1995 to 2006) 
 Positive 
impact 
 
Quattri and Fosu 
(2012) 
40 SSA countries -29 HIPCs 
(1995-2009) 
  No impact 
 
The above review clearly shows that the impact of debt relief on investment is 
ambiguous, (see Table 1). These differences may be due to differences in econometric 
methodologies, time (most of them were done before most countries have received relief or 
have adjusted after the HIPC) as well as sample coverage. In addition, most papers have been 
including investment and other independent variables, thus no special attention was given to 
the direct impact of HIPC on investment. 
Pursuant to the gap indicated above, this paper will focus on strictly investment, 
separating public investment and private investment in SSA. The argument for investment is 
16 
 
as summarized by Domeland and Kharas (2009) and Addison (2006). They indicated that 
debt relief could stimulate investment by 1) altering the debt dynamics and freeing domestic 
resources from debt servicing for development expenditures (creating fiscal space), 2) 
eliminating the debt overhang and encouraging investment and then growth, 3) paving way 
for additional borrowing (financing) for investment, and 4) improving institutional and 
governance quality of beneficiary countries that will adopt specific reform programs and in 
turn encourage private investment. 
The ambiguity from these studies emanate from the sample sizes and methodologies 
applied. All countries which qualify for the HIPC Initiative were classified in 1996 at its 
launch, forming the treatment group. Its impact in each country will be realized at and after 
the completion point, which is based on the country specific progress in implementing the set 
conditionalities. Therefore, an assessment of the impact of the period from 1996 [Marcelino 
and Hakobyan (2014), Cassimon at el. (2013)] is more plausible to identify the pre-treatment 
effect. The difference in completion point will mean extending the period to cover more 
countries is ideal. Therefore, this paper covers period 1996 to 2013. It is also important to 
compare the trend in investment with other countries in the same region (Sub-Saharan Africa), 
for which investment is assumed to have been different due to high external debt. 
Regarding the methodologies used in most of these papers, it is important to review 
the nature and characteristics of the HIPC Initiative.  Countries that benefited from the HIPC 
Initiative were not chosen because of the unsustainable level of external debt and level of 
income, which is non-random. In addition, there exist a group of low income countries in the 
same region under investigation in this paper (control group) and therefore a natural 
experiment to compare the impact of the policy that affect debt relief beneficiaries only. In 
this case, the difference in difference become an optimal methodology, for which only Knoll 
(2013) and Chauvin and Kraay (2005) have partially used. Thus conflicting results on the 
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impact of debt relief on investment among researchers need to be clarified using the 
difference in difference which control for fixed effects, is suitable for non-random 
experiments, control for pre-treatment and post-treatment effects.  
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3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
3.1. Methodology 
Given the nature and characteristic of the problem under investigation in this research, 
where countries are not randomly selected, and that the HIPC Initiative is specific policy 
intervention whose impact is being investigated, it is prudent to empirically test the 
hypothesis stated in chapter 1 using the widely used impact evaluation methodology, the 
Difference-in-Differences (D-i-D). The D-i-D is applicable on non-random samples and also 
takes into account the pre-existing differences between treatment and control groups. As 
stated by Lechner (2011), the D-i-D estimator can be used to estimate the effects of policy 
interventions that do not affect all the treatment and control units within a sample. This is the 
case with the HIPC Initiative, which only targeted indebted countries within the group of low 
income countries, owing to high and unsustainable debt. Therefore, in order to assess the 
impact of debt relief under the HIPC Initiative on investment in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 
the D-i-D method is appropriate.  
This methodology have also been used by Knoll (2013) and Chauvin and Kraay 
(2005), in assessing the impact of debt relief. However, Knoll (2013) applied the D-i-D on 
repeated cross-sections, which could not capture the time effects as well as assessing whether 
control and treatment groups trend together. Lechner (2011), pointed panel data is superior to 
repeated cross section since it allows the inclusion of additional control variables that jointly 
affect outcomes with the policy intervention, in addition to the ability to follow outcome 
dynamics overtime. In this regard, this paper will apply the D-i-D on panel data, to capture 
the pre-existing difference between the control and treatment groups, and will include 
additional control variables to capture the effects of other factors on investment, which may 
or may not have improved due to debt relief. 
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3.1.1. Model specification 
The baseline specification of a difference-in-differences estimator that is derived from 
the equation for panel data is specified in equation (1) below. 
 
Investment = β0 + β1HIPC + β2AFTER + β3HIPCAFTERi+ ε ……………………(1) 
 
where Investment will represent vector of selected investment variables which will be 
gross fixed formation to GDP (total, public and private), HIPC is a treatment dummy taking 
1 for countries which achieved the HIPC debt relief completion point and 0 for countries that 
did not get debt relief in SSA, AFTER is a time dummy taking 1 for years after 2004 for non-
HIPCs & year of completion (2003, 2004 or 2005) for HIPCs and 0 otherwise. The 
HIPCAFTER is the interaction dummy of the two dummies (HIPC and AFTER).  
In order to account for other factors that affect investment in SSA other than debt 
relief and also to reduce the bias from potential differences in time trend, additional set of 
variables will be included in the model, denoted by X as shown on the model in equation (2) 
below.  
 
Investment = β0 + β1HIPC + β2AFTER + β3HIPCAFTER + β4X + ε ………………….(2) 
 
The list of macroeconomic control determinants of investment in SSA is summarized 
as follows:  
Table 10: Determinants of Investment in SSA, other empirical researches 
Variable References  
Current account deficit Clements at. el, (2003); Shawa at. el, (2012); Agidew, (2014). 
GDP Clements at. el, (2003), Shawa at. el, (2012); Agidew, (2014). 
Natural resources Mhlanga, (2010). 
Private/Public Investment*  Agidew, (2014), Babajide, (2011); Ndikumana (2000) 
*public investment and private investment relationship (Crowding out or Complementary) 
As indicated on this model, HIPC dummy is time invariant variable and must be 
included in the model to capture the preexisting differences between the HIPCs and non-
HIPC in 1996. In this sense, the D-i-D will be done on the OLS model which allows the time 
invariant factors. Given that this OLS model follows the random effects model, it is chosen 
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and will be subjected to diagnostic test for the random effects appropriateness. These include 
the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier for testing the variances across entities, which is 
there is no difference in variances of the error term across the countries included in the 
sample and the OLS model is appropriate. To take care of possible heteroskedasticity and 
raise the confidence level on the results, robust standard errors will be used. 
3.2. Data 
Out of the 49 countries in SSA, 29 countries (See Annex1) have received debt relief 
under the HIPC Initiative between 2000 and 2012. However, due to the differences in the 
year of completion and data problems, only 8 countries that received debt relief from 2003 to 
2005 will be included. A panel data will be used covering the period 1996 to 2013. The 
source of data is World Development Indicators (August 2015). It is considerable to note that 
HIPC completion point was attained in different years. In order to effectively evaluate the 
outcome of debt relief under the D-i-D method, it is substantial to use a single year of 
completion to effectively evaluate the impact of debt relief through time changes, therefore 
the sample selection section explains how the sample have been developed.  
3.2.1. Sample Selection 
The sample selected has 15 countries, for which 8 will be HIPC which attained the 
completion point in 2003 to 2005 and 7 non-HIPCs (the total number of countries which did 
not receive debt relief in SSA and data is available). The motivation for the choice of this 
period is: 1) the highest number of countries that received debt relief under HIPC Initiative in 
SSA was in 2004 (5 countries); 2) to increase sample size and reduce potential estimation 
errors, three (3) additional countries added received debt relief in 2003 & 2005 for which 
debt relief effects on investment might not be different from 2004 HIPCs; and this period 
(2003 to 2005) provides for enough pre and post treatment effects since its almost at the 
middle of the sample covered in this paper; 1996 to 2013. HIPC dummy will take 1 for 
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countries that attained HIPC completion status in 2003, 2004 and 2005. and 0 for countries 
that did not get debt relief. AFTER dummy will be a time variable which takes 1 for the 
period 2004 to 2013, while 0 for the period 1996 to 2003 (year of completion for HIPCs, 
which is 2003, 2004 or 2005). HIPCAFTER dummy will be the interaction between the two 
dummies, HIPC and AFTER dummies. For details of countries included, see Annex 1. 
 
Table 11: Data Description and Sources 
Label Description  Source 
Total Investment Gross fixed capital formation (%f GDP) World 
Development 
Indicators  
Private Investment Gross fixed capital formation, private sector (% of GDP) 
Public Investment Gross fixed capital formation, Public sector (% of GDP) Author calculations 
HIPC Dummy Take 1 for no HIPC and 0 non-HIPCs Author 
classification 
AFTER Dummy Take 1 from 2004/2005 to 2013 and 0 from 1996 to 
2003/2004 or year of completion. 
Author 
classification 
HIPCAFTER Interaction between the HIPC and AFTER dummies Author 
classification 
Current Account  Measured by difference between the exports and imports 
of goods and services (% of GDP). 
World 
Development 
Indicators GDP GDP per capita annual growth (%) 
External Debt External debt stocks (% of GNI) 
Natural Resources Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) 
 
 
 
Table 12: Summary Statistics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
      
Total Investment (% of GDP) 269 22.73 8.188 8.615 74.82 
Private Investment (% of GDP) 264 14.19 7.051 2.047 52.17 
Public Investment (% of GDP) 264 8.458 3.716 2.363 24.38 
Current Account (% of GDP) 270 -10.34 23.38 -118.3 40.87 
GDP (per capita annual growth %) 270 2.340 3.774 -15.28 18.51 
External Debt (% of GNI) 270 48.86 38.01 4.117 226.3 
Natural Resources (% of GDP) 270 12.76 15.57 0.00338 71.48 
HIPC 270 0.533 0.500 0 1 
AFTER 270 0.559 0.497 0 1 
HIPCAFTER 270 0.300 0.459 0 1 
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Table 13: Correlation Matrix 
 Total 
Investment 
Private 
Investment 
Public 
Investment 
Current 
Account 
GDP External 
Debt 
Total Investment 1.0000      
Private Investment 0.8923 1.0000     
Public Investment 0.5162 0.7040 1.0000    
Current Account -0.4818 -0.4600 -0.2022 1.0000   
GDP 0.1146 -0.0390 0.3411 -0.0001 1.0000  
External Debt -0.0454 -0.0050 -0.0820 -0.0278 -0.1298 1.0000 
Natural Resources -0.0426 -0.1255 0.1330 0.4775 0.1194 0.2638 
HIPC -0.0924 -0.1332 0.0685 -0.1374 -0.0417 0.2531 
AFTER 0.0779 0.0230 0.1161 -0.0009 0.1633 -0.5662 
HIPCAFTER 0.1610 0.0974 0.1902 -0.1400 0.0632 -0.2846 
 Natural 
Resources 
HIPC AFTER HIPCAFTER   
Natural Resources    1.0000      
HIPC -0.1964 1.0000     
AFTER 0.0475 0.0070 1.0000    
HIPCAFTER -0.1092 0.6124 0.5812 1.0000   
 
3.2.2. Definition of Variables 
As mentioned earlier, the dependent variable will be investment, which will be 
separated into three equations for total, private and public investment. The independent 
variable will be, HIPC dummy, AFTER dummy, HIPCAFTER dummy and other control 
variables which are GDP per capita growth, natural resources rent, external debt, current 
account deficit, and ODA.  
Investment is measured by the Gross Fixed Capital Formation as a share of GDP, 
which is the volume of both domestic and foreign fixed assets investment as a share of GDP. 
This will be divided into 3 where total investment will be the GFCF, private investment will 
be Gross Fixed Capital Formation Private sector as a share of GDP and public investment is 
the residual1. Considering the sample of 15 countries selected, in 1996, HIPC countries total 
investment in SSA averaged 17% of GDP and grew to around 27% of GDP in 2013 (See 
chart 2). On the other hand, non-HIPCs averaged 30% of GDP total investment in 1996 
which relatively slowed to 24% of GDP in 2013.  
                                                 
1 The residual (public investment) calculated by the difference between total investment and private investment, 
be based on the assumption that there are only two investment agencies: the private sector and public sector 
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Private investment grew from 10% in 1996 to 16% in 2013 and public investment 
grew from 8% to 10% during the same period for HIPCs. On the other side, non-HIPCs 
private investment fell from 20% to 14%, while public investment was 10% of GDP in 1996 
and in 2013 averaged 8% of GDP. Due to data limitations on public investment, the 
difference between total and private investment from the World Bank Indicators was used as 
a proxy to estimate public investment.  
On average, the table below shows the total, private and public investment levels 
before and after the HIPC completion point (2004).  
Table 14: Investment in SSA (% of GDP), Before and After HIPC 
Total Investment Private Investment Public Investment 
 Before After Before After Before After 
HIPC 18.6 24.8 10.9 15.2 7.6 9.5 
Non-HIPC 25.9 21.3 17.6 13.3 8.3 8.0 
Source: Author 
 
The current account deficit measured by the difference between exports and imports 
as a share of GDP averaged 13% in 1996 for non-HIPC and 8% for HIPCs. After debt relief, 
HIPCs on average had a higher current account deficit which stood at 12% in 2013, while 
non-HIPCs current account deficit reduced to as low as 1% in 2013. 
Real GDP per capita measured at 2005 prices show significant increase in non-
HIPCs, averaging US$3,387 in 1996 and moved to US$5,356 in 2013. This was far from the 
HIPC level in both years. In 1996, HIPCs GDP per capita averaged $403, which is around the 
IDA qualification cut off.  
Natural resource rent as a share of GDP which measures the countries level of 
proven natural resources has been constant overtime, indicating that there has not been much 
natural resource discoveries. However, comparing the two categories, HIPC countries were 
endowed with more natural resources than non-HIPC, with HIPCs having natural resource 
rent to GDP averaging 15% in 1996 and 18% in 2013. Non-HIPC averaged 12% of GDP both 
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in 1996 and 2013. In this regard, is critical to control for natural resource rent, since the 
improved investment in HIPCs could have been stimulated by the availability of natural 
resources. On the other hand, there was improved governance which may have motivated 
investors to carry out natural resources exploration activities in HIPCs. 
External Debt as a percentage of GNI has been relatively constant standing at 55% of 
GNI in 2013, in non-HIPC countries, although it reduced from the 1996 average of 56% of 
GNI to 33% of GNI in 2004. Compared to non-HIPCs, countries that attained HIPC 
completion witnessed significant improvements in their debt levels, which moved from an 
average of 123% of GNI in 1996 to 32% of GNI in 2013. This was however, made possible 
by debt relief in the form of HIPC. In addition, debt service in HIPC countries reduced from 
5% of GNI in 1999 to 1.2% of GNI in 2013, while non-HIPC debt service ratio to GNI 
remained relatively constant at 6% of GNI.  
3.3. Expected Results 
Given the model specified above, and the vector of X control variables listed, the 
coefficient of HIPCAFTER dummy, β3 is expected to be positive. This measures the 
difference in investment levels between HIPCs and non-HIPCs after the HIPC completion 
point, taking into account their pre-treatment levels. In other words, if debt relief had impact 
in SSA, a positive and significant β3 is expected for total, private and public investment. 
Thus HIPC are expected to have improved both private and public investment, owing to 
lower debt levels and conducive environment for investment created during the 
implementation of conditionalities set under the HIPC Initiative.  
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4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This section will provide a detailed account of the results generated from the 
quantitative data analysis using panel data for the period 1996 to 2013 applied on the OLS 
Difference-in-Difference (D-i-D) estimation method. In addition, the critical analysis of the 
results will be done in the discussion section.  
4.1. Results and interpretation 
The simple (baseline) D-i-D regression (Table 7) results, which include only 3 
dummy variables, suggest that HIPC was able to stimulate investment in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The HIPCAFTER which measures the level of investment in HIPC countries after the 
attainment of HIPC completion point, show that investment was able to improve after the 
debt relief in HIPCs since the coefficient is positive and is significant at 1% for total 
investment. The results further suggest that this increase in total investment in SSA was 
driven by private investment, which has a positive and significant coefficient at 5%. (See 
column 2, table 7). In addition, public investment also improves in HIPC countries, with the 
coefficient significant at 10%. 
Table 15: Baseline Difference-in-Difference regression: OLS 
Dependent Variable: INVESTMENT 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Total Private  Public 
    
HIPC -7.348* -6.640** -0.762 
 (4.119) (3.205) (1.433) 
AFTER -4.279 -4.128 -0.313 
 (3.258) (3.143) (0.993) 
HIPCAFTER 10.45*** 8.316** 2.285* 
 (3.882) (3.915) (1.264) 
Constant 25.91*** 17.61*** 8.358*** 
 (3.781) (2.877) (1.257) 
    
Observations 269 264 264 
No of Countries 15 15 15 
Wals Chi2(3) 10.29 
(0.0163) 
5.87 
0.1179 
8.72 
(0.0333) 
R-Squared 0.1807 0.1379 0.0717 
Breusch Pagan LM 411.05 
(0.0000) 
287.17 
(0.0000) 
464.56 
(0.0000) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
26 
 
The validity of D-i-D methodology used is based on the critical assumption that 
differences between the two groups remain constant in the absence of policy intervention. 
However, this may be difficult to satisfy, given that countries have totally different 
investment policies and operating environment, as evidenced by the HIPC countries’ failure 
to attain the HIPC completion point in the same year. Although the D-i-D methodology takes 
into account the pre-existing differences between the two groups (HIPC dummy) using panel 
data, it allows for the inclusion of other variables (vector of X) to control for differences in 
trends which are unrelated to the debt relief intervention. In addition, the Wals Chi2(3) which 
test the overall significance of the model in OLS estimation must have a p-value less that 5%, 
(for 5% significance level used by this author). However, from the baseline model above, the 
results suggest that private investment equation is not significantly different from zero. 
Given the above background, I added a vector of macroeconomic variables that may 
affect investment to reduce the bias from the potential differences in time trend as well as to 
improve the significance of the private investment equation. The private and public equations 
have an additional variable for the other type of investment to test the effects of crowding out 
effect. It is also critical to control for the effects of external debt in the equation, since the 
policy was done to reduce the level of debt which affects investment. However, there is 
possible multiple-causality since the HIPC and HIPCAFTER dummies in the model follow 
closely the level of external debt in HIPC countries. 
The macroeconomic control variables have been used in levels (column 1 and 2) as 
well as demeaned values (column 3 and 4) in Tables 8, 9 and 10. Given that the D-i-D 
estimation is a set of fixed effects model, the use demeaned variables is to remove the 
country specific issues by taking the observed deviations from the mean at country level that 
is removing country fixed effects variables.  
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Table 8: Controlled Difference-in-Difference regression: OLS Model 
Dependent Variable: TOTAL INVESTMENT 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
HIPC -6.744* -7.007** -4.110 -4.142 
 (3.550) (3.486) (3.550) (3.338) 
AFTER -2.967** -2.800* -2.656** -2.629* 
 (1.417) (1.599) (1.217) (1.382) 
HIPCAFTER 6.558*** 6.773*** 5.877*** 5.927*** 
 (2.205) (2.113) (2.083) (2.109) 
Current Account -0.416*** -0.414***   
 (0.0480) (0.0572)   
GDP 0.307*** 0.313***   
 (0.0612) (0.0651)   
Resources 0.169 0.165   
 (0.108) (0.119)   
External Debt  0.00650   
  (0.0189)   
Demeaned Current Account   -0.479*** -0.478*** 
   (0.0737) (0.0848) 
Demeaned GDP   0.347*** 0.348*** 
   (0.0677) (0.0705) 
Demeaned Resources   0.157 0.156 
   (0.106) (0.111) 
Demeaned External Debt    0.00123 
    (0.0199) 
Constant 18.83*** 18.55*** 24.29*** 24.28*** 
 (3.739) (3.781) (3.266) (3.375) 
     
Observations 269 269 269 269 
No of Countries 15 15 15 15 
Wals Chi2(3) 186.94 
(0.000) 
223.62 
(0.000) 
121.84 
(0.000) 
122.90 
(0.000) 
R-Squared 0.5198 0.5198 0.5238 0.5235 
Breusch Pagan LM 377.39 
(0.000) 
383.44 
(0.000) 
796.41 
(0.000) 
769.01 
(0.000) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The total investment results from the controlled equations (Table 8) for which the 
overall models are significant at 1%, and the Breusch Pagan Lagrange Multiplier also 
justifying the use of the OLS model, suggest that HIPC Initiative has significant impact on 
total in SSA. Whether external debt have been controlled for as in columns (2) and (4) or not 
controlled ( columns 1 and 3) the HIPC Initiative was able to stimulate investment in SSA by 
more than 5% of GDP at 1% level of significance. These results are also similar both 
equations taking into account levels or demeaned control variables. 
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Tables 9, with results from the private investment equation clearly show the 
importance of control variables, particularly demeaned values in the model. The overall 
model for private investment is now significant at 1% and the natural resources in columns 2 
and 3 (which are demeaned) are significant compared to baseline result in Table 7. Therefore, 
at 5% level of significance, the HIPC Initiative had significant impact of private investment 
in SSA.  
Table 16: Controlled Difference-in-Difference regression:OLS Model 
Dependent Variable: PRIVATE INVESTMENT 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
HIPC -6.219** -7.070** -3.840 -4.219* 
 (3.077) (2.991) (2.658) (2.500) 
AFTER -3.036** -2.493* -2.700*** -2.371** 
 (1.306) (1.333) (0.852) (0.983) 
HIPCAFTER 5.501*** 6.192*** 4.514** 5.115*** 
 (2.082) (1.958) (1.896) (1.911) 
Current Account -0.353*** -0.347***   
 (0.0518) (0.0607)   
GDP 0.168* 0.185*   
 (0.0983) (0.0979)   
Resources 0.159 0.146   
 (0.100) (0.117)   
Public Investment -0.198 -0.175   
 (0.254) (0.262)   
External Debt  0.0216   
  (0.0215)   
Demeaned Current Account   -0.458*** -0.443*** 
   (0.0664) (0.0811) 
Demeaned GDP   0.236*** 0.241*** 
   (0.0846) (0.0859) 
Demeaned Resources   0.187** 0.183* 
   (0.0925) (0.101) 
Demeaned Public Investment   -0.194 -0.177 
   (0.258) (0.264) 
Demeaned External Debt    0.0152 
    (0.0215) 
Constant 13.17*** 12.06*** 16.09*** 15.94*** 
 (4.280) (4.574) (2.369) (2.467) 
     
Observations 264 264 264 264 
No of Countries 15 15 15 15 
Wals Chi2(3) 381.03 
(0.000) 
384.72 
(0.000) 
135.79 
(0.000) 
165.80 
(0.000) 
R-Squared 0.5208 0.5244 0.5309 0.5334 
Breusch Pagan LM 284.72 
(0.000) 
296.53 
(0.000) 
670.59 
(0.000) 
640.82 
(0.000) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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In addition, Table 10 provide for results from the public investment equation, for 
which the Breusch Pagan LM and Wals Chi2(3) suggest the random effects model is appropriate and 
the overall model is significant. Focus in the HIPCAFTER dummy, column 1 with control variables in 
levels show that HIPC had significant impact on investment at 5%. However, if controlled for external 
debt, the impact becomes significant only at 10%. This researcher is more satisfied with demeaned 
control variables which may have reduced time invariant unobservable and country specific effects. In 
this regard, columns 3 and 4 will help conclude that at 10% level of significance, debt relief had some 
impact on public investment in SSA.  
Table 17: Controlled Difference-in-Difference regression: OLS Model 
Dependent Variable: PUBLIC INVESTMENT 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
HIPC -1.068 -0.508 -0.580 -0.197 
 (1.468) (1.512) (1.424) (1.418) 
AFTER -0.636 -0.903 -0.501 -0.787 
 (0.891) (0.884) (0.929) (0.901) 
HIPCAFTER 2.345** 1.827* 2.254* 1.626 
 (1.157) (1.018) (1.178) (1.099) 
Current Account -0.0634*** -0.0695***   
 (0.0244) (0.0261)   
GDP 0.175** 0.164**   
 (0.0701) (0.0723)   
Resources 0.0347 0.0434   
 (0.0332) (0.0335)   
Private Investment -0.0735 -0.0652   
 (0.0928) (0.0959)   
External Debt  -0.0125   
  (0.00941)   
Demeaned Current Account   -0.0711 -0.0818 
   (0.0520) (0.0532) 
Demeaned GDP   0.165** 0.157** 
   (0.0731) (0.0731) 
Demeaned Resources   -0.0147 -0.0119 
   (0.0548) (0.0557) 
Demeaned Private Investment   -0.0827 -0.0753 
   (0.110) (0.111) 
Demeaned External Debt    -0.0143 
    (0.0102) 
Constant 8.208*** 8.557*** 8.289*** 8.421*** 
 (2.107) (2.108) (1.249) (1.314) 
     
Observations 264 264 264 264 
No of Countries 15 15 15 15 
Wals Chi2(3) 24.65 
(0.0009) 
25.48 
(0.0013) 
27.64 
(0.0003) 
27.51  
(0.0006) 
R-Squared 0.1174 0.1279 0.1247 0.1378 
Breusch Pagan LM 227.67 
(0.000) 
211.49 
(0.000) 
484.04 
(0.000) 
492.52 
(0.000) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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As indicated in chapter 1, there are two claims which would help to answer the 
research questions on the impact of debt relief on total, private and public investment have 
been tested in this section. Regarding hypothesis 1 which state that debt relief under the HIPC 
Initiative has impact on investment, both private and public, the above analysis proved that 
there is clear evidence that the HIPC Initiative was able to stimulate total and private 
investment at 5% level of significance. However, the programme had smaller impact on 
public investment than private investment. 
Hypothesis 2, which motivated the separation of public investment from private 
investment claim that there is differences in impact of debt relief on private and public 
investment. In order to test this hypothesis, I compare the two results for the HIPCAFTER 
dummy from the private and public investment questions (Tables 9 & 10). Given the 
conclusion that debt relief had smaller impact on public investment in SSA than private, the 
conclusion that can be drawn is to accept the null hypothesis that there is difference in the 
impact of debt relief on private investment and public investment. 
Regarding a vector of control variables, this research also provided no evidence of 
crowding effect in SSA, since the public investment on private investment was not significant 
and also vice versa. The current account deficit is suggested to be negatively related to 
investment; total and private. Natural resources are also suggested to important factor that 
stimulates private investment in SSA, while real GPD per capita growth is significant for 
public, private and total investment.  
4.2. Discussion  
The existing body of literature though has not been directly focusing on investment 
specifically and those who looked at investment used different methodologies and samples 
coverage; some of their results have been suggestive of the fact that HIPC Initiative has 
impact on investment, through private investment and little via public investment (See Table 
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1). The conclusion from this paper is relatively similar to Knoll (2013), who also found that 
HIPC was able to stimulate total investment, driven by private investment with no impact on 
public investment and Raddatz (2009) who found HIPC significant for private investment. 
This is 2014different from the results found by Cassimon at el (2013), Sichula (2012), Quattri 
and Fosu (2012), Cassimon and Campenhout (2007) and Chauvin and Kraay (2005). 
The results indicated about cast some doubts on the summary by Domeland and 
Kharas (2009) and Addison (2006) on the channels through which debt relief affects 
investment in SSA. The debt overhang hypothesis can be supported by debt relief impact on 
private investment but there is little evidence to support the fiscal space theory. In conclusion, 
debt relief therefore affects investment in SSA by; 1) eliminating the debt overhang and 
encouraging investment and then growth, and 2) improving institutional and governance 
quality of beneficiary countries that will adopt specific reform programs and in turn 
encourage private investment.  
It is, however, not convincing to refute the fact that debt relief alter the debt dynamics 
and freeing domestic resources from debt servicing for development expenditures and also 
pave way for additional borrowing (financing) for investment. The possible reason for failure 
to realize significantly higher impact on public investment equation may emanate from the 
fact that the HIPC conditionalities emphasized the need for social expenditures particularly 
health and education which may be classified as recurrent expenditure by governments.  
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5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1. Conclusion 
The overall aim of the study was to evaluate the impact of debt relief on investment 
under the HIPC Initiative in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The clear distinction between the 
public and private investment have been done to test the impact of debt relief in the view of 
private sector and public sector. The results indicated that HIPC Initiative had significant 
impact on total investment in the region. This increase in total investment in SSA was mainly 
driven by private investment, which proved to have highly responded positively to debt relief 
owing to improved governance and macroeconomic stability brought by the implementation 
of the PRSP. However, there is little evidence to support the claim the HIPC Initiative has 
significant impact on public investment. In addition, there was significant difference in 
impact of debt relief on investment between the private and the public sector, for which the 
private sector was responsive, suggesting the improvements experienced in HIPC countries 
on the doing business index. These results also clearly support the debt overhang hypothesis 
and relatively suggest the fiscal space theory in SSA.  
In conclusion, debt relief therefore affects investment in SSA by; 1) eliminating the 
debt overhang and encouraging investment and then growth, and 2) improving institutional 
and governance quality of beneficiary countries that will adopt specific reform programs and 
in turn encourage private investment.  
5.2. Policy Recommendations 
In view of the above results and conclusion, the positive impact of debt relief on 
investment should be embraced by the beneficiary countries and use it as a platform to 
continue implementing sound macroeconomic and governance issues in order to end poverty 
in SSA. Although the HIPC Initiative was developed to end poverty and attain the 
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Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), it is important that the positive outcome of debt 
relief on investment be encompassed during the setting up of Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs), in both the donor community and recipients countries to attain the following: 1) 
optimal conditionalities that stimulate incentive for action to both recipient and donor 
countries; 2) poverty reduction and inclusive growth in low income countries particularly 
SSA; and 3) a clear framework that focus on investment as a lasting solution to poverty 
reduction.  
The findings of this paper suggest that HIPC has greater impacts on private 
investment than public investment in SSA, it is recommended that the HIPC countries place 
emphasis on improvement of institutional and governance and macroeconomic environment 
for the private sector activities, such as improvement of World Bank’s Doing Business 
Indicators. In addition, considering less impact of HIPC on public investment, the debt relief 
package in future may also focus on directly promote public investment including setting 
clear quantitative and qualitative targets. 
5.3. Areas for further research 
The failure to prove that debt relief has impact on public investment in this paper 
maybe true but insufficient to conclude without a detailed look into the classification of 
public investment expenditures as well as the ability to trace how resources saved from debt 
relief are spend. As stated earlier, the HIPC Initiative’s PRSP emphasized reduction of 
poverty through social expenditures on education and health. In this regard, these may have 
been recorded as recurrent expenditures, whereas expenditure on education is clearly human 
capital investment. Therefore, further research is recommended on the impact of debt relief 
on social service delivery in SSA or the fiscal response models before and after the HIPC 
Initiative. 
34 
 
REFERENCES 
Addison, T. (2006). Debt relief: The development and poverty impact. Swedish Economic 
Policy Review. 13(2006). 205-230. 
Agidew, E. T., (2014). An Investigation of Macroeconomic Determinants of Domestic 
Private Investment Evidence from East Africa. International Institute of Social 
Studies. 
Babajide, F. (2011). Financial Sector Reforms and Private Investment in Sub-Saharan 
African Countries. Journal of Economic Development, 36(3), 76-97. 
Bert, H. & Helmut, R. (1990). Debt Overhang, Liquidity Constraints and Adjustment 
Incentives. OECD Development Centre. Working Paper No. 32. 
Birdsall, N. Claessens, S. & Diwan, I. (2002). Will HIPC Matter? The Debt Game and Donor 
Behaviour in Africa. World Institute for Development Economics Research 
Discussion Paper No. 2002/50. 
Bhattacharya, R., & Clements, B. (2004). Calculating the Benefits of Debt Relief: How 
cutting the external debt burden can boost growth in low-income countries. IMF 
Working paper WP/03/249. International Monetary Fund. 
Cassimon, D at el. (2013). Dynamic Fiscal Impact of the Debt Relief Initiatives on African 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs). Document De Travail DT/2013-01. 
Cassimon, D., & Campenhout, B. V. (2007). Aid Effectiveness, Debt Relief and Public 
Finance Response: Evidence from a Panel of HIPCs. Review of World Economics, 
143(4), 742-763 
Chauvin, D. C. & Kraay, A. (2005). What Has 100 Billion Dollars Worth of Debt Relief 
Done for Low-Income Countries? Princeton University and Inter-American 
Development Bank and World Bank. 
Clements, B., Bhattacharya, R., & Nguyen, T. (2003). External Debt, Public Investment, and 
35 
 
Growth in Low-Income Countries. International Monetary Fund. Working paper 
WP/03/249. 
Cohen, D., & Sachs, J. (1986). Growth and External Debt under Risk of Debt Repudiation. 
European Economic Review, 30, 437 - 472.  
Domeland, D., & Kharas, H. (2009). Debt Relief and Beyond: Lessons Learned and 
Challenges Ahead; Debt Relief and Sustainable Financing to Meet the MDGs. 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The World Bank.  
Gunduz, Y. B. et al. (2013). The economic impact of IMF-supported programs in low income 
countries. International Monetary Fund. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, (2001). Debt Relief for Poverty 
Reduction: The Role of the Enhanced HIPC Initiative. International Monetary Fund.  
International Monetary Fund, (2014). Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) — Statistical Update. International 
Monetary Fund.  
Heller, P. S. (2005). Understanding Fiscal Space. Fiscal Affairs Department. IMF Policy 
Discussion Paper PDP/05/4. International Monetary Fund. 
Koeda, J. (2008). A Debt Overhang Model for Low-Income Countries. IMF Staff Papers 
55(4). International Monetary Fund. 
Knoll, M. (2013). The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries and the Multilateral Debt Relief 
Initiative: A Test Case for the Validity of the Debt Overhang Hypothesis. 
FreieUniversitat, Berlin. School of Business and Economics, Discussion paper 
2013/11.  
Krugman, P. (1988). Financing Vs. Forgiving a Debt Overhang. NBER Working Paper Series 
No. 2486, National Bureau Of Economic Research (NBER). 
Lechner, M. (2011). The Estimation of Causal Effects by Difference-in-Difference Methods. 
36 
 
Universitant St.Gallen, Discussion Paper no. 2010-28. 
Marcelino, S. R., & Hakobyan, I. (2014). Does Lower Debt Buy Higher Growth? The Impact 
of Debt Relief Initiatives on Growth. International Monetary Fund. Working paper 
WP/14/230. 
Mhlanga, N. (2010). Private sector agribusiness investment in sub-Saharan Africa. Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Agricultural Management, Marketing 
and Finance Working Document. 
Myers, S. C. (1977). Determinants of Corporate Borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics, 
5 (1977), 147-175. North-Holland Publishing Company  
Nankani, G. & Allen, M. (2004). Debt Sustainability in Low-Income Countries: Further 
Considerations on an Operational Framework and Policy Implications. International 
Monetary Fund and International Development Association (World Bank). 
Ndikumana, L. (2000). Financial Determinants of Domestic Investment in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: Evidence from Panel Data. World Development. 28(2). 381- 400. 
Pattillo, C., Poirson, H., & Ricci, Luca. (2004). What Are the Channels Through Which 
External Debt Affects Growth? International Monetary Fund. Working paper 
WP/04/15. 
Quattri, M. & and Fosu, A. K. (2012). On the Impact of External Debt and Aid on Public 
Expenditure Allocation in Sub-Saharan Africa after the Launch of the HIPC Initiative. 
World Institute for Development Economic Research. Working Ppaper No 2012/42. 
Raddatz, C. (2009). Multilateral Debt Relief through the Eyes of the Financial Markets. The 
World Bank. Policy Research Working Paper 4872. 
Sachs, D. J. (1989). Conditionality, Debt Relief, and the Developing Country Debt Crisis. 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Shawa, K. C., Mwega, F. & Kulundu, D. (2012). Private Investment in Sub-Saharan Africa: a 
37 
 
Dynamic Panel Approach. Journal of Economic Research. 17(2012). 247-281 
Sichula, M. (2012). Debt Overhang and Economic Growth in HIPC Countries: The Case of 
Southern African Development Community (SADC). International Journal of 
Economics and Finance, 4 (10). 
The World Bank. Economic Policy and Debt. Steps of the HIPC Initiative: Review of the 
HIPC Process. Retrieved on 22 September 2015 from: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTDEBTDEPT/0,,content
MDK:20655535~menuPK:64166739~pagePK:64166689~piPK:64166646~theSitePK
:469043,00.html 
World Economic and Financial Surveys. (2014). Regional Economic Outlook, Sub-Saharan 
Africa: staying the course. International Monetary Fund.  
38 
 
 
ANNEX 1: List of Countries in Sub Saharan Africa – HIPCs and Non-HIPCs 
HIPC Non-HIPC 
1. Benin (2003) 
2. Burkina Faso (2000) 
3. Burundi (2009) 
4. Cameroon (2006) 
5. Central African Republic (2009)* 
6. Comoros (2012)** 
7. Congo, Dem. Rep. (2010) 
8. Congo (Brazzaville) (2010) 
9. Cote d'Ivoire (2012)** 
10. Ethiopia (2004) 
11. Gambia, The MET (2007) 
12. Ghana (2004) 
13. Guinea MET (2010) 
14. Guinea-Bissau (2010)* 
15. Liberia (2008) 
16. Madagascar (2004) 
17. Malawi (2006) 
18. Mali (2003) 
19. Mauritania (2002) 
20. Mozambique (2001) 
21. Niger (2004) 
22. Rwanda (2005) 
23. Sao Tome and Principe (2007)* 
24. Senegal (2004) 
25. Sierra Leone (2006) 
26. Tanzania (2001) 
27. Togo (2010) 
28. Uganda (2000) 
29. Zambia (2005)* 
1. Angola 
2. Botswana 
3. Cape Verde* 
4. Djibouti* 
5. Equatorial Guinea* 
6. Gabon 
7. Kenya* 
8. Lesotho 
9. Mauritius 
10. Namibia* 
11. Seychelles* 
12. South Africa 
13. Swaziland 
 
Still to decide/ Complete, New 
Country, Exceptional Relief 
14. Chad (TBA) 
15. Eritrea 
16. Nigeria 
17. Somalia 
18. South Sudan  
19. Sudan 
20. Zimbabwe 
 
 Notes:  
1. Numbers in parentheses ( ) indicated the time (year) in which the country attained the HIPC completion point.  
2. Countries in bold are countries selected in the sample. 
3. *Countries have limited data and have not been included in all samples. 
